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State Estimation Over Markovian Packet Dropping Links
in the Presence of an Eavesdropper
Alex S. Leong, Daniel E. Quevedo, and Subhrakanti Dey
Abstract— Remote state estimation problems in the presence
of an eavesdropper have recently been studied. In this setup,
a sensor transmits over a random packet dropping link to a
remote estimator, which at the same time can be randomly
overheard by an eavesdropper. For i.i.d. packet dropping links
to the remote estimator and to the eavesdropper, it has been
shown that with unstable systems one can keep the expected
estimation error covariance bounded, while the expected eaves-
dropper error covariance becomes unbounded in the infinite
horizon. In this paper we show that the same behaviour can be
achieved when transmission of local state estimates occur over
a Markovian packet dropping link, and eavesdropping occurs
according to another Markovian packet dropping link.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, more and more data is being transmitted
wirelessly, e.g. using Wi-Fi or smartphones. Due to the
broadcast nature of the wireless medium, other agents in
the vicinity can often overhear what is being transmitted,
and there is a need to protect systems from eavesdroppers.
Traditionally, associated information security issues have
been studied in the context of cryptography. However, due
to the often limited computational power available at the
transmitters to implement strong encryption, as well as the
increased computational power available to malicious agents,
achieving security using solely cryptographic methods may
not necessarily be sufficient. Thus, alternative ways to imple-
ment security using information theoretic and physical layer
techniques, complementary to the traditional cryptographic
approaches, have attracted significant recent interest [1].
In information theoretic security, a communication system
is regarded as secure if the mutual information between the
original message and what is received at the eavesdropper
is either zero or becomes vanishingly small as the block
length of the codewords increases [2]. The term “physical
layer security” has been used to describe ways to implement
information theoretic security using physical layer charac-
teristics of the wireless channel such as fading, interference,
and noise, see e.g. [3], [4].
Motivated in part by the ideas of physical layer security,
the consideration of security issues in signal processing and
estimation systems has also started to gain the attention
of researchers. In estimation problems with eavesdroppers,
studies include [5]–[8] for estimation of constants or i.i.d.
sources, and [9]–[11] for state estimation of dynamical
systems.
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Fig. 1. Remote State Estimation with an Eavesdropper
The current paper is most closely related to [10], [11] in
considering state estimation of dynamical systems. A sensor
transmits to the remote estimator over a packet dropping
link, which might be overheard by an eavesdropper over
another packet dropping link. For i.i.d. packet drops and
unstable systems, without using feedback acknowledgements
mechanisms were derived in [10] for making the expected
eavesdropper error covariance unbounded while keeping the
expected estimation error covariance bounded, under the
condition that the eavesdropping probability is less than the
packet reception probability. With the use of feedback, the
same behaviour can be achieved for all eavesdropping proba-
bilities strictly less than one [11]. The current paper extends
the result in [11] to correlated packet drops, in particular
to Markovian packet drop channels. In a slightly different
context with coding over uncertain wiretap channels, it was
shown in [9] that for unstable systems one can keep the
estimation error at the legitimate receiver bounded, while
the eavesdropper estimation error becomes unbounded for a
sufficiently large coding block length.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II describes the system model. Section III presents
our main results. Numerical studies are given in Section IV.
Section V draws conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A diagram of the system model is shown in Fig. 1. We
consider a discrete time process
xk+1 = Axk + wk (1)
where xk ∈ Rn and wk is i.i.d. Gaussian with zero mean and
covariance Q > 0.1 There is a sensor with measurements
yk = Cxk + vk, (2)
1For a symmetric matrix X , we say that X > 0 if it is positive definite,
and X ≥ 0 if it is positive semi-definite. Given two symmetric matrices X
and Y , we say that X ≤ Y if Y −X is positive semi-definite, and X < Y
if Y −X is positive definite.
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where yk ∈ Rn and vk is Gaussian with zero mean and
covariance R > 0. We assume the noise processes {wk} and
{vk} to be mutually independent.
The sensor transmits local estimates x̂sk|k to the remote
estimator [12]. The local estimates and error covariances
x̂sk|k−1  E[xk|y0, . . . , yk−1], x̂sk|k  E[xk|y0, . . . , yk],
P sk|k−1  E[(xk − x̂sk|k−1)(xk − x̂sk|k−1)T |y0, . . . , yk−1],
P sk|k  E[(xk − x̂sk|k)(xk − x̂sk|k)T |y0, . . . , yk],
can be computed at the sensor using the standard Kalman
filter. Assume that the pair (A,C) is detectable and the pair
(A,Q1/2) is stabilizable. Let P̄ be the steady state value
of P sk|k as k → ∞, which exists due to the detectability
assumption. In order to simplify the subsequent presentation,
the local Kalman filter will be assumed to be operating in
the steady state regime, so that P sk|k = P̄ , ∀k. We note that
under the assumptions stated, the local Kalman filter will in
general converge to steady state at an exponential rate.
Let νk ∈ {0, 1} be decision variables such that νk = 1 if
and only if x̂sk|k is to be transmitted at time k. We shall focus
on a situation where the decision variables νk are determined
at the remote estimator (based on information available at
time k − 1), and then fed back to the sensor.
Sensor transmissions occur over a temporally correlated
Markovian packet dropping channel to the remote estimator.
Let γk be random variables such that γk = 1 if a sensor
transmission at time k is successfully received by the remote
estimator, and γk = 0 otherwise. The process {γk} is a time-
homogeneous Markov chain, with transition probabilities
(using notation similar to [13]):
p  P(γk = 0|γk−1 = 1), q  P(γk = 1|γk−1 = 0). (3)
The sensor transmissions can be overheard by an eaves-
dropper over another Markovian packet dropping channel.
Let γe,k be random variables such that γe,k = 1 if a sensor
transmission at time k will be overheard by the eavesdropper,
and γe,k = 0 otherwise. The process {γe,k} is a time-
homogeneous Markov chain with
pe  P(γe,k = 0|γe,k−1 = 1), qe  P(γe,k = 1|γe,k−1 = 0).
We will assume that p, q, pe, qe ∈ (0, 1), so that the stationary
distributions of {γk} and {γe,k} exist. The processes {γk}
and {γe,k} are also assumed to be mutually independent.2
At time instances where νk = 1, it is assumed that
the remote estimator knows whether the transmission was
successful or not, i.e., the remote estimator knows the value
γk, with dropped packets discarded. Define
Ik {ν0, . . . , νk, ν0γ0, . . . , νkγk, ν0γ0x̂s0|0, . . . , νkγkx̂sk|k}
as the information set available to the remote estimator at
time k. Denote the state estimates and error covariances at
2In wireless communications, channel fading becomes approximately in-
dependent for receivers separated by distances greater than half a wavelength
of the transmitted signal [14, p.71]. For current wireless communication
standards (e.g. 3G/4G, Wi-Fi), such wavelengths are on the order of
centimeters.
the remote estimator by:
x̂k|k−1  E[xk|Ik−1], x̂k|k  E[xk|Ik],
Pk|k−1  E[(xk − x̂k|k−1)(xk − x̂k|k−1)T |Ik−1],
Pk|k  E[(xk − x̂k|k)(xk − x̂k|k)T |Ik].
(4)
Similarly, the eavesdropper knows if it has eavesdropped
sucessfully. Define
Ie,k {ν0, . . . , νk, ν0γe,0, . . . , νkγe,k,
ν0γe,0x̂
s
0|0, . . . , νkγe,kx̂
s
k|k}
as the information set available to the eavesdropper at time
k, and the state estimates and error covariances at the
eavesdropper by:
x̂e,k|k−1  E[xk|Ie,k−1], x̂e,k|k  E[xk|Ie,k],
Pe,k|k−1  E[(xk − x̂e,k|k−1)(xk − x̂k|e,k−1)T |Ie,k−1],
Pe,k|k  E[(xk − x̂e,k|k)(xk − x̂e,k|k)T |Ie,k].
For simplicity of presentation, we will assume that the initial
covariances P0|0 = P̄ and Pe,0|0 = P̄ , and that γ0 and
γe,0 have the stationary distributions of {γk} and {γe,k}
respectively.
As previously mentioned, the transmission decisions νk
are determined at the remote estimator and fed back to
the sensor.3 In this paper we will allow νk to depend on
Pk−1|k−1, and our beliefs of Pe,k−1|k−1 constructed from
knowledge of previous νk’s, see also [11] where only i.i.d.
packet drops were considered.4 The optimal remote estimator
can be shown to have the form
x̂k|k =
{
Ax̂k−1|k−1 , νkγk = 0
x̂sk|k , νkγk = 1
Pk|k =
{
f(Pk−1|k−1) , νkγk = 0
P̄ , νkγk = 1
(5)
where
f(X)  AXAT +Q, (6)
while, at the eavesdropper, the estimator has the form5
x̂e,k|k =
{
Ax̂e,k−1|k−1 , νkγe,k = 0
x̂sk|k , νkγe,k = 1
Pe,k|k =
{
f(Pe,k−1|k−1) , νkγe,k = 0
P̄ , νkγe,k = 1.
Define the countable set of matrices:
S  {P̄ , f(P̄ ), f2(P̄ ), . . . }, (7)
where fn(.) is the n-fold composition of f(.), with the
convention that f0(X) = X . The set S consists of all
possible values of Pk|k at the remote estimator, as well as
3The case of imperfect feedback acknowledgements can also be handled,
see Section II-C of [15].
4In fact, the threshold policy of Section III will only require knowledge
of Pk−1|k−1.
5This assumes that the eavesdropper knows the system parameters
A,C,Q,R. If these are unknown, then the performance at the eavesdropper
will in general be worse. Such an assumption is similar to Kerckhoff’s
principle in cryptography [16], where a cryptosystem should be secure even
if the enemy knows everything about the system except the secret key.
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all possible values of Pe,k|k at the eavesdropper. There is a
total ordering on the elements of S given by (see e.g. [17])
P̄ ≤ f(P̄ ) ≤ f2(P̄ ) ≤ ... (8)
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this paper we are interested in the case where A is
unstable, i.e. the spectral radius ρ(A) > 1. In this section,
we will show that for unstable systems, in the infinite horizon
situation (or as time k → ∞) there exist transmission
policies which can drive the expected eavesdropper error
covariance unbounded while keeping the expected estimator
error covariance bounded. This can be achieved for all
Markovian packet dropping channels with pe ∈ (0, 1) and
qe ∈ (0, 1).
Similar to the scheme proposed in [11] for the case of i.i.d.
packet drops, consider the threshold policy which transmits
at time k if and only if Pk−1|k−1 ≥ f t(P̄ ) for some t ∈ N
(by (8) such a comparison can always be made). In Theorem
3.3 we show that this policy has the required properties when
t is sufficiently large. In order to obtain our result, we will
first analyze the performance of this policy at the remote
estimator.
Define the function g(.) by
g(x)  (1− q)x+ p(1− x), (9)
with p and q as in (3). Let gn(.) be the n-fold composition
of g(.), where we use the convention that g0(x)  x.
Lemma 3.1: Suppose that A is unstable, and that (1 −
q)ρ(A)2 < 1. Consider the threshold policy which transmits
at time k if and only if Pk−1|k−1 ≥ f t(P̄ ) for some t ∈ N.
Under this policy, {Pk|k} has a stationary distribution and
as k → ∞,
lim
K→∞
1
K
K∑
l=1
trE[Pl|l] = trE[Pk|k]
= π0,1tr
[
P̄ +
t∑
j=1
f j(P̄ ) + gt(p)
∞∑
j=t+1
(1− q)j−t−1f j(P̄ )
]
< ∞
(10)
for all finite t ∈ N, where
π0,1 =
q
q(t+ 1) + gt(p)
. (11)
Proof: See Appendix
Remark 3.2: The equations (10)-(11) provide an analyti-
cal expression for the performance of the threshold policy,
which can be easily computed numerically.
Theorem 3.3: Suppose that A is unstable, and that (1 −
q)ρ(A)2 < 1. Consider the threshold policy which transmits
at time k if and only if Pk−1|k−1 ≥ f t(P̄ ), where t is
sufficiently large that
ρ(A)
[ (
gt−1(p)q + (1− gt−1(p))(1− p)) pe
pe + qe
]1/2(t+1)
> 1
(12)
is satisfied, with g(.) defined by (9). Then
limK→∞ 1K
∑K
k=1 trE[Pk|k] is bounded and, at the
eavesdropper, limK→∞ 1K
∑K
k=1 trE[Pe,k|k] is unbounded.
Proof: Since (1 − q)ρ(A)2 < 1, Lemma 3.1 shows
that limK→∞ 1K
∑K
k=1 trE[Pk|k] < ∞ for any finite t ∈ N.
So it remains to show that limK→∞ 1K
∑K
k=1 trE[Pe,k|k] is
unbounded.
For a horizon K > t, consider the event ω where
each transmission is successfully received at the remote
estimator, and unsuccessfully received by the eavesdropper.
By a similar argument to [18], we will show that the
contribution of the event ω will already cause the expected
eavesdropper covariance to become unbounded as K → ∞.
Now under this event, and using the threshold policy, the
number of transmissions which occur over the horizon K
is K/(t + 1)	. The probability that each transmission is
successfully received is given by(
πt,0
πt,0 + πt,1
q +
πt,1
πt,0 + πt,1
(1− p)
)K/(t+1)
=
(
πt,0
π0,1
q +
πt,1
π0,1
(1− p)
)K/(t+1)
=
(
gt−1(p)q + (1− gt−1(p))(1− p))K/(t+1)
where πt,0 and πt,1 are defined in (13), and the second and
third lines make use of the relations (15) and (16). Since
none of the transmissions are successfully eavesdropped,
the eavesdropper error covariances are given by Pe,k|k =
fk(P̄ ), k = 1, . . . ,K, with a probability(
P(γe,k−1 = 0)(1− qe) + P(γe,k−1 = 1)pe
)K/(t+1)
of this occurring, where we have the stationary probabilities
P(γe,k−1 = 0) =
pe
pe + qe
, P(γe,k−1 = 1) =
qe
pe + qe
.
Then by independence of the remote estimator and eaves-
dropper channels, the probability of the event ω is
P[ω] =
(
gt−1(p)q + (1− gt−1(p))(1− p))K/(t+1)
×
(
pe
pe + qe
(1− qe) + qe
pe + qe
pe
)K/(t+1)
.
Let ωc denote the complement of ω. We have
1
K
K∑
k=1
trE[Pe,k|k]
=
1
K
K∑
k=1
trE[Pe,k|k|ω]×P(ω) + 1
K
K∑
k=1
trE[Pe,k|k|ωc]×P(ωc)
>
1
K
K∑
k=1
trE[Pe,k|k|ω]P(ω)
=
1
K
K∑
k=1
tr
(
AkP̄ (Ak)T +
k−1∑
m=0
AmQ(Am)T
)
×
[ (
gt−1(p)q + (1− gt−1(p))(1− p)) pe
pe + qe
]K/(t+1)
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>
1
K
tr(AK P̄ (AK)T )
×
[ (
gt−1(p)q + (1− gt−1(p))(1− p)) pe
pe + qe
]K/(t+1)
→ ∞ as K → ∞,
where the last line holds if condition (12) is satisfied. Since
ρ(A) > 1 and(
gt−1(p)q + (1− gt−1(p))(1− p)) pe
pe + qe
> min(q, 1− p) pe
pe + qe
> 0,
condition (12) will always be satisfied when t is sufficiently
large. As 1K
∑K
k=1 trE[Pk|k] remains bounded for every finite
t ∈ N by Theorem 3.1, the result follows.
In summary, the threshold policy which transmits at
time k if and only if Pk−1|k−1 ≥ f t(P̄ ), with t large
enough that condition (12) is satisfied, will have the required
properties that limK→∞ 1K
∑K
k=1 trE[Pk|k] is bounded and
limK→∞ 1K
∑K
k=1 trE[Pe,k|k] is unbounded.
Remark 3.4: The condition (12) provides a sufficient con-
dition for determining how large t needs to be before the ex-
pected eavesdropper covariance becomes unbounded. In the
case of i.i.d. packet drops with packet reception probability
λ and eavesdropping probability λe, we have p = 1 − λ,
q = λ, pe = 1−λe, qe = λe. Then g(p) = g(1−λ) = 1−λ,
which implies that gt−1(1−λ) = 1−λ. Thus condition (12)
reduces to
ρ(A)(λ(1− λe))1/2(t+1) > 1,
which is equivalent to the condition derived in [11].
Remark 3.5: For i.i.d. packet drops, when transmitting
measurements and without using feedback acknowledge-
ments, mechanisms were derived in [10] for making the
expected eavesdropper error covariance unbounded while
keeping the expected estimation error covariance bounded,
under the condition that λe < λ. With the use of feedback
and transmitting local state estimates, the same behaviour
can be achieved for all λe < 1 [11]. Theorem 3.3 extends
the result in [11] to all Markovian packet drop channels with
pe, qe ∈ (0, 1).
Remark 3.6: The result of Theorem 3.3 can still apply
even without exact knowledge of pe and qe. For instance,
suppose we only have upper bounds on qe and 1 − pe
(the probabilities of successfully eavesdropping the next
transmission). Since pe/(pe + qe) is decreasing in qe and
increasing in pe (or decreasing in 1 − pe), using a t that
satisfies (12) for the upper bounds on qe and 1 − pe will
ensure that (12) is also satisfied for all values of qe and
1− pe less than the upper bounds.
IV. NUMERICAL STUDIES
We consider an example with parameters
A =
[
1.2 0.2
0.3 0.8
]
, C =
[
1 1
]
, Q = I, R = 1.
t
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
E
[P
k]
100
102
104
106
108
tr E[P
e,k|k
]
tr E[P
k|k
]
Equation (10)
Fig. 2. Expected error covariance at estimator and expected error covariance
at eavesdropper. p = 0.4, q = 0.8, pe = 0.4, qe = 0.8.
The steady state error covariance P̄ is easily computed as
P̄ =
[
1.3411 −0.8244
−0.8244 1.0919
]
.
We first consider the case with p = 0.4, q = 0.8,
pe = 0.4, qe = 0.8. Using the threshold policy which
transmits at time k if and only if Pk−1|k−1 ≥ f t(P̄ ), Fig.
2 plots trE[Pk|k] and trE[Pe,k|k] for different values of t,
obtained by taking the time average of a Monte Carlo run of
length 1000000. For comparison, the analytical expression
for trE[Pk|k] in equation (10) is also given. In this case, we
can verify that (1 − q)ρ(A)2 < 1 holds, and that condition
(12) for unboundedness of the expected eavesdropper covari-
ance is satisfied when t ≥ 2
Next we consider an asymmetric case with p = 0.5, q =
0.7, pe = 0.3, qe = 0.9. From the definitions of p, q, pe, qe
we see that the eavesdropper’s channel is better than the
estimator’s channel in this case. Fig. 3 plots trE[Pk|k] and
trE[Pe,k|k] for different thresholds, together with the analyti-
cal expression (10). In this case, (1−q)ρ(A)2 < 1 also holds
and condition (12) is satisfied for t ≥ 3.
We see that by using a sufficiently large t, in both cases we
can make the expected error covariance of the eavesdropper
very large, while keeping the expected error covariance at
the remote estimator bounded.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have studied remote state estimation over
a Markovian packet dropping link, where each transmission
can be overheard by an eavesdropper according to another
Markovian packet dropping link. In the infinite horizon
situation, we have shown that if the underlying process
is unstable, one can keep the expected estimation error
covariance bounded while the expected eavesdropper error
covariance becomes unbounded. The constructed scheme is
a simple threshold policy on the estimation error covariance.
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t
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
E
[P
k]
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
tr E[P
e,k|k
]
tr E[P
k|k
]
Equation (10)
Fig. 3. Expected error covariance at estimator and expected error covariance
at eavesdropper. p = 0.5, q = 0.7, pe = 0.3, qe = 0.9.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 3.1. We can firstly describe the behaviour
of this policy using a Markov chain with transition diagram
shown in Fig. 4. where the first component of each state
(P, γ) represents the value of Pk−1|k−1, and the second
component the value of γk−1. For p ∈ (0, 1) and q ∈ (0, 1),
this Markov chain can be easily shown to be irreducible,
aperiodic, and with all states being positive recurrent. Then
the stationary probabilities
πi,j  P(Pk−1|k−1 = f i(P̄ ), γk−1 = j) as k → ∞ (13)
will exist, and {Pk|k} will have a stationary distribution.
Enumerate the states of this Markov chain in the order
(P̄ , 1), (f(P̄ ), 0), (f(P̄ ), 1), (f2(P̄ ), 0), (f2(P̄ ), 1), . . . ,
(f t(P̄ ), 0), (f t(P̄ ), 1), (f t+1(P̄ ), 0), (f t+2(P̄ ), 0), . . . . The
transition probability matrix P is then given by (14). Call
π 
[
π0,1 π1,0 π1,1 π2,0 π2,1 . . . πt,0 πt,1
πt+1,0 πt+2,0 . . .
]
.
The stationary probabilities can then be found be solving the
equation π = πP. The first few relations are:
π1,0 = pπ0,1
π1,1 = (1− p)π0,1
π2,0 = (1− q)π1,0 + pπ1,1
π2,1 = qπ1,0 + (1− p)π1,1
...
πt,0 = (1− q)πt−1,0 + pπt−1,1
πt,1 = qπt−1,0 + (1− p)πt−1,1,
from which we obtain
π0,1 = π1,0 + π1,1 = π2,0 + π2,1 = · · · = πt,0 + πt,1. (15)
We will now show that πj,0 = g
j−1(p)π0,1 and πj,1 =
(1 − gj−1(p))π0,1 for j = 1, 2, . . . , t. The proof is by
induction. The statement is clearly true for π1,0 and π1,1.
Now assume that the statement is true for πj−1,0 and πj−1,1.
Then
πj,0 = (1− q)πj−1,0 + pπj−1,1
= (1− q)gj−2(p)π0,1 + p(1− gj−2(p))π0,1
= g(gj−2(p))π0,1 = gj−1(p)π0,1,
where the second line used the induction hypothesis and the
third line used (9). Furthermore, from (15) we have
πj,1 = π0,1 − πj,0 = (1− gj−1(p))π0,1,
which completes the induction argument.
Continuing on, it is straightforward to show that πj,0 =
gt(p)(1− q)j−t−1π0,1 for j = t+1, t+2, . . . . In summary,
we have derived that:
πj,0 = g
j−1(p)π0,1, j = 1, 2, . . . , t
πj,1 = (1− gj−1(p))π0,1, j = 1, 2, . . . , t
πj,0 = g
t(p)(1− q)j−t−1π0,1, j = t+ 1, t+ 2, . . . (16)
Since the probabilities must sum to one, we have
π0,1 +
t∑
j=1
(πj,0 + πj,1) +
∞∑
j=t+1
πj,0
=
(
t+ 1 +
gt(p)
q
)
π0,1 = 1
or π0,1 =
q
q(t+1)+gt(p) , from which all the other stationary
probabilities can be calculated using (16). The expected error
covariance as k → ∞ can then be expressed as
E[Pk|k] = E[Pk−1|k−1]
= π0,1P̄ +
t∑
j=1
(πj,0 + πj,1)f
j(P̄ ) +
∞∑
j=t+1
πj,0f
j(P̄ )
= π0,1
[
P̄ +
t∑
j=1
f j(P̄ ) + gt(p)
∞∑
j=t+1
(1− q)j−t−1f j(P̄ )
]
.
(17)
We want to show that the infinite series above converges
if and only if (1 − q)ρ(A)2 < 1. Note that for the case
where one always transmits local estimates over a Markovian
packet dropping link, which corresponds to t = 0, we have
π0,1 =
q
q+p , and so
E[Pk|k] =
q
q + p
[
P̄ + p
∞∑
j=1
(1− q)j−1f j(P̄ )
]
.
From [19], we know that E[Pk|k] is bounded if and only if
(1− q)ρ(A)2 < 1, so that
∞∑
j=1
(1− q)j−1f j(P̄ ) < ∞ iff (1− q)ρ(A)2 < 1.
Then
∞∑
j=t+1
(1− q)j−t−1f j(P̄ ) = 1
(1− q)t
∞∑
j=t+1
(1− q)j−1f j(P̄ )
< ∞ iff (1− q)ρ(A)2 < 1,
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Fig. 4. Markov chain for threshold policy
P=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 p 1− p 0 0 0 0 . . . . . .
0 0 0 1− q q 0 0 . . . . . .
0 0 0 p 1− p 0 0 . . . . . .
0 0 0 0 0 1− q q . . .
0 0 0 0 0 p 1− p . . .
...
...
. . .
0 0 . . . . . . 1− q q 0 0 0 . . .
0 0 . . . . . . p 1− p 0 0 0 . . .
q 0 . . . . . . 0 0 1− q 0 0 . . .
1− p 0 . . . . . . 0 0 p 0 0 . . .
q 0 . . . . . . 0 0 0 1− q 0 . . .
q 0 . . . . . . 0 0 0 0 1− q . . .
...
...
. . .
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(14)
and thus, from (17), we have that trE[Pk|k] < ∞ for any
finite t ∈ N.
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